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
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


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
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


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Review article

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THE GEOGRAPHY OF THE ITALIAN REFUGEE RECEPTION AND "LAMPEDUSA OF THE NORTH-EAST" CASE STUDY

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Abstract: Perhaps the leaders of Europe, who have been trying for months to find a solution for the refugee crisis, should go to Trieste. The city has been called the 'Lampedusa of the North-East' and in the 1990s it welcomed hundreds of refugees from the former Yugoslavia. It therefore has experience of the 'integrated reception model', which is the exact opposite of the huge centres such as the one in Mineo (Sicily), unsurprisingly referred to as 'warehouses' by American experts, such as the director of the Migration Policy Institute in Washington, Demetrios Papademetriou. In contrast, the Trieste system relies on a network of accommodation in apartments and small structures. This is all down to the city administration that, in collaboration with local NGOs, has done a good job in interpreting and implementing the 'spirit' of the SPRAR (Protection System for Asylum Seekers and Refugees created by Italian Law 189/2002). This explains why today, according to the latest ICS-Caritas data, 70 per cent of reception places in Trieste are in private apartments or small structures. The main advantage of this is that it prevents the refugees from being seen as a perpetual emergency. Is this a role model for the rest of Europe? We'll try answer to this question.

Keywords: forced migration, migration policies and asylum policies, social exclusion, refugee, territory, refugee camp.

Sažetak: Verovatno bi lideri Evropske Unije koji mesecima, a sada već i godinama, pokušavaju da pronađu rešenje za migrantsku/izbegličku krizu, trebalo da posete Trst. Grad je dobio epitet "Lampeduza severoistoka", i 90-ih godina XX veka je primio na stotine izbeglica iz bivše SFR Jugoslavije. Zbog toga u Trstu postoji iskustvo u "integrisanom modelu prijema" koji je suprotan konceptu velikih centrara kao što je onaj u Mineo na Siciliji, a koji su od strane američkih eksperata opisani kao "skladište", kako ih je nazvao Demetrios Papademetriou, direktor Instituta za migracionu politiku (Migration Policy Institute - MPI) iz Vašingtona. Suprotno tome, Tršćanski sistem se zasniva na mreži manjih prihvatnih smeštaja u apartmanima i kućama. Lokalna samouprava je, zajedno sa nevladinim organizacijama, uradila dobar posao u shvatanju i primeni aktivnosti u "duhu" SPRAR-a (Sistema zaštite tražilaca azila i izbeglica), koji je definisan italijanskim Zakonom 189/2002. To objašnjava zašto je prema poslednjem izveštaju Karitasa 70 % prijema migranata u Trstu izvršeno upravo po privatnim apartmanima i malim objektima. Osnovna prednost ovog rešenja je da se zaštite izbeglice od opšte prihvaćenog stava da predstavljaju stalnu pretnju. Da li je ovo model koji bi mogao biti primenjen i u ostalim delovima Evrope? Na to će ovaj rad pokušati da odgovori.

Cljučne reči: prnudne migracije, migraciona politika i politika azila, socijalna izolovanost, izbeglo lice, prostor, izbeglički kamp.

INTRODUCTION

Faced with the most serious refugee emergency since post World War II (Cusimano & Mercatanti, 2017), Italy is the only EU country that finds itself without an organic law for political asylum. A political and legal anomaly that has undoubtedly played a role in disrupting the timing, structure and quality of welcome systems for refugees in Italy, and even the geography and distribution of the centers throughout the national territory established for them.

A *vacatio legis* all the more difficult to understand and justify if one takes into consideration that it represents a failure to implement an article of the Italian Constitution that has existed since 1948, art. 10 comma 3, which declared “the foreigner, if not allowed to effectively exercise the democratic freedom in his country, guaranteed by the Italian Constitution, shall have the right to asylum in the territory of the Republic according to the conditions established by law”. The problem, as stated earlier, is that the law was never enacted. And it is herein that lies the mortal sin, though certainly not the only one, regarding the politics of asylum in Italy. But like cherries, one sin leads to another, and in 1954 during the ratification of Geneva Convention on refugee status, Italy invoked the so-called “geographical restriction”. A restriction that guaranteed refugee status according to the guidelines of the Convention, but only with respect to women, children and individuals of European origin, excluding those from all other continents. Thus, the the guarantees of the Convention were reserved to a restricted range of subjects, for the most part, those escaping from the communist regime of the Soviet Union. This restricted filter remained in place for almost 40 years, until it was abrogated, thanks to the Law n. 39 in 1990, better known as the Martelli law: named after the Deputy Prime Minister of Italy at the time: signatory and promoter of the first provision that attempted to formally regulate the migratory phenomenon in Italy. Though its deficits were numerous with regard to political asylum, its merit for having overcome the principle of “geographical restriction” cannot be overlooked. But, neither can its greatest demerit: not having implemented art. 10, comma 3 of the Italian Constitution, specifically regarding asylum, still today relegated to a handful of legislative interventions and laws of judges.

ITALY TURNED INTO A LAND OF ASYLUM, AS WELL AS ONE OF IMMIGRATION

This legislative chaos remained the *status quo* until cracks started coming to the fore in 2011, years after the Albanian and then the Yugoslavian refugee emergency. And after the Arab Spring exploded with the sudden violence

of an earthquake (Terranova, 2011), turning Italy definitively into a land of asylum (Betts, 2009), as well as one of immigration. To get the idea, one need only consider that in 2011, the number of requests for asylum alone reached 38,000 – triple the 13,000 that had represented the average number of annual applications in the preceding 20 year period. Which explains why, in the face of this geographical revolution and the movements of an overwhelming number of individuals requesting asylum on a global scale, Italy, for reasons heretofore explained, was unprepared.

Italy's scenario of inadequate internal legislative and political responses was compounded by the lack of sufficient responses externally throughout the European Union. The discussion of deficits (internal and external) would not be complete without mentioning the Convention signed in Dublin in 1990 by 12 EU member states and implemented in 1997, updated in 2003 (Dublin II) and in 2013 (Dublin III). The Convention, with a grouping of regulations, established two fundamental principles that would determine which state would examine the request for international protection: 1) the state responsible for the management of each refugee's application for asylum is the state where the refugee's immediate relatives live; 2) in the event that it is not possible to establish family ties, the state that will be responsible for managing the application and acceptance of asylum is the first state in which the refugee sets foot. In other words, except in cases where a certification of blood line between an individual already living in one of the EU member states and the refugee is possible, a refugee's identification and stay rests always and exclusively with the country where the refugee first landed.

The objective of the Dublin Convention was to impede what has been termed *asylum shopping*: the practice of applying for asylum in more than one country simultaneously. The outcome, however, was that the enormous responsibility of managing this special category of immigrant was assigned to a limited number of countries: first, in the early '90's, to countries bordering the ex-Soviet Union (Kolossov, 2011), Germany *in primis*, and later, for a decisively longer period, to countries that shared maritime borders (Pagnini, 2014) with North Africa – Italy, Greece and Spain. It's a situation that clearly ignored the principle of burden sharing (i.e. the equitable division of costs/responsibilities of various initiatives among states) and seriously called into question the Schengen agreement. Here, it is indispensable to go back one step, from the political and legislative timeline presented up to this point. The Schengen agreement, signed on June 14, 1985, (in Schengen, Luxemburg) by Belgium, France, Germany, Luxemburg and Holland was intended to abolish border controls between the founding countries (i.e. initial signatories). Thirty years from its creation, the Schengen area has been extended to a territory

that includes 26 countries (including 4 extra-EU nations) with more than 400 million residents, where EU citizens can travel without passports or restrictions of any kind. It is a pity, though, that while the zone of free circulation expanded and internal border controls (i.e. within that zone) were eliminated, very little attention was given to the other part of the equation – control of the external borders. In fact, no thought was given to the necessity of creating a common European Agency that would be responsible for that task. In other words, for many years the EU had the pretention of creating and expanding its borders, while at the same time, relegating to each single member state the burden of monitoring against illegal immigrants coming from third-party countries and repatriating them, when necessary. A contradiction that has a plausible explanation: not all member states, for reasons of mere geography, were interested in the creation of, and above all, in the financing of, a supranational authority responsible for the monitoring and protection of external borders. With the outcome being identical to what occurred, *mutatis mutandis*, with the Convention of Dublin: an enormous burden of border control being thrust upon the countries of southern Europe. “Within this context, the expanding of the Union contributed to the paradox of making, for example, Malta – an EU member state since 2004 – the primary gatekeeper of a frontier, that of Europe, which extends for more than 10,000 kilometers” Giordano (2015).

A scenario that was complicated even more by the silence of Brussels, which for too long a time, decided to not decide. In fact, only in 2005, did the European Commission take the initiative to establish the European Agency for the Control of External Borders (FRONTEX), which remained behind the scenes for the first five years of its existence. Headquartered in Warsaw, far from the critical immigration routes, it was equipped with a Lilliputian staff and a budget equal to that of a small Italian town. In fact, until recently, the role of the Agency was limited to intelligence activities, due to strict statutory caveats: more specifically, the elaboration of shared information pertaining to migratory flows and the training of customs officers. Of course, in parallel, FRONTEX also participated in coordinating cross-border control missions throughout Europe, the leadership of which was always entrusted exclusively to the host country’s authorities. On October 6th (2016) this *modus operandi* was at least formally replaced and from the ashes of FRONTEX, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency was born. The agency, which compared to FRONTEX will have increased powers and a broader mandate, will also have a resource pool with at least 1500 border guards coming from various member states (125 from Italy) that will be able to provide a rapid response when necessary. Next steps toward full operation will be a section dedicated to repatriation in January

(2017) and between the months of January – March, an evaluation of the vulnerability of the borders will be carried out.

THE DICHOTOMY OF THE ITALIAN SYSTEM OF REFUGEE RECEPTION

Over the last five years, within this fluid, confused, and ill-defined context, Italy has borne the burden of the first and second reception of asylum-seekers¹ from the southern Mediterranean, arriving in their makeshift boats. Contrary to the humanity and excellence embodied by Italy's first welcome to those arriving in this fashion (with *Mare Nostrum* launched in 2013² by the administration of Prime Minister Enrico Letta) until today, the second phase has presented more than a few problems and critical concerns. Because inherent to the current legislation is a dichotomy deemed unreasonable by its many critics³. On one hand, there are the large, overcrowded, ill - conceived and poorly managed, state controlled *Centri di Accoglienza per Richiedenti Asilo* (Welcome Centers for Asylum Seekers) known as C.A.R.A. On the other hand, the better of the two systems (at least in theory), the *Sistemi di Protezione per Richiedenti Asilo* (System for the Protection of Asylum - seekers, S.P.R.A.R.), a diffused and integrated program spread throughout the territory, managed by the municipality on a voluntary basis. And, to exacerbate operations further, often alongside the official systems, are improvised, emergency solutions that are governed by third parties and by a plethora of administrative provisions, rather than according to primary legislation.

To understand the juxtaposition of these two very different, antithetical systems, it is important to look at them more closely. First, the CARA: an excessive concentration of thousands of human beings in a limited territorial area, in precarious psycho-physical and economic conditions (Brusa, 2000). The result has been referred to as the "banlieue effect". Because, precisely as happened in the large French suburbs, when a conspicuous number of subjects, all united by various forms of social marginalization were placed in a limited space, the outcome was historically disastrous: on the immigrants

¹ It is necessary to clarify that a significant percentage, after verification, do not meet the necessary criteria for obtaining refugee status, as stipulated by the Geneva Convention. They are, therefore, classified as illegal immigrants and according to current legislation, should be repatriated. A difficult task which is beyond the scope of this paper to address.

² Promoted after the tragic sinking of a "carretta del mare" on October 3, 2013, that claimed the lives of 366 immigrants, the more than year-long military and humanitarian operation that lasted until November 2014 was at Italy's expense including emergency care of the immigrants and asylum-seekers who had tried to cross the Mediterranean in makeshift boats in order to get to Italy.

³ Among others, we cite Gianfranco Schiavone, vice-presidente dell'Associazione per gli Studi Giuridici (ASGI) e fondatore del Consorzio Italiano di Solidarietà (I.C.S.).

themselves and also on the local communities who host the governmental center whose turn it happens to be, without any clear direction. Within this context, a disturbing example is the CARA di Mineo in the province of Catania. Born as “Residence of Oranges” and designed to host the military base of Sigonella in 2011, the Prime Minister of Italy at the time, Silvio Berlusconi, converted it to a welcome center hosting over 5,000 refugees, becoming one of the largest in Europe. A huge “Babylon” populated by an army of lost souls, whose real identity or origin no one knows for sure. To the point where it difficult to know whether we are talking about illegal immigrants, asylum-seekers, criminals or terrorists. A galaxy of suffering souls caged in an eternal purgatory waiting for the fateful “Yes” or “No” for the response to their application for asylum. A ghetto reality setting the stage for the dangerous phenomena of marginality, upon which unscrupulous teams of immigrant reception “professionals” speculated: winning million-dollar public contracts for managing the center, with means that are currently under investigation by the Italian judiciary.

The CARA model is not a failure only in Italy, but in all corners of the globe. Take, for example, the case of Calais, Northern France’s version of CARA Mineo. The super-Center with 10,000 refugees located in a small city, which has appropriately been baptized “The Jungle”. Created in 2003 with the Anglo-French Treaty of Le Touquet, it ended up being a true catalyst for numerous problems: social, health, and human. Not to mention problems related to civil unrest and public safety. In fact, the management of this center will be decisive in the French presidential election of 2017. And the situation does not get any better if one shifts focus from the European refugee camps to those in Lebanon or Jordan. In fact, it gets worse. And not only because, according to one of the most detailed studies published on this topic (Hathaway, 1997), a conflict lasts from 5-7 years and once it is over, only 50 % of the refugees repatriates. But, mostly because in a situation where in a camp (UNHCR or governmental) located in a European town, there is nothing for the refugee to do except wait for the possibility to go home at the end of the war, there will undoubtedly be repercussions. The reality is, as Paul Collier, Director of the Study of African Economies of Oxford University, tells us: “in a jobless household in the camp, it is hard for parents to retain authority. Teenage girls are lured into prostitution, teenage boys drift back to Syria and to armed gangs” Collier (2016). Perhaps for this reason, in his numerous studies regarding huge welcome centers filled with refugees throughout the world, Demetrios Papademetriou, Director of the Migration Policy Institute of Washington, has often defined them as *human warehouses*.

Turning attention to the second model (in the existing Italian dichotomy) the SPRAR, it must be said that it represents (on paper, at least) an excellent

Italian initiative.

Starting with the experience of decentralized and networked reception in the years 1999 – 2000 by associations and non-governmental organizations, and in 2001, when the Ministry of the Interior, Department for Civil Liberties and Immigration, the National Association of Italian Municipalities (ANCI) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) all signed a Memorandum of Understanding (M.O.U.) for the creation of a "National Program for Asylum". This is how the first public system for the reception of asylum-seekers and refugees, spread throughout the Italian territory, was born – with the involvement of central and local institutions according to a shared responsibility between the Ministry of the Interior and the local governments. Later, the Law n.189/2002 formally institutionalized the SPRAR, a measure of organized reception. A clearly articulated and complex system that, in any event, represents a solution to not only an Italian problem, but also a European and International issue: burden sharing. In other words, the necessity to redistribute and distribute the economic, social and political burden of welcoming asylum-seekers in the different regions, with regard to Italy, and to different member states, with regard to the EU. The SPRAR, in fact, introduced the principle of "relocation" much earlier, *mutatis mutandis*, than that which the European Commission (headed by Jean-Claude Juncker), tried to introduce on a European level, with the European Agenda on Immigration, on May 22, 2014. In particular, that European Community initiative attempted to redistribute, for the most part, by sea, 160,000 asylum-seekers in Greece and Italy. Based on a precise calculation, for each country took into consideration 4 factors: total population (40 %), GDP (40 %), the number of asylum applications received in the last four years, and unemployment rate. To assist and motivate the states to implement this complex mechanism, Brussels attempted to create an *ad hoc* budget of €780 million.

However, it is now a well-known fact that, despite well-intentioned proposals, the SPRAR, and in equal measure the "Juncker Plan" worked poorly or not at all. This is partly due to the fact that in both cases, the principle of relocation required a large dose of "voluntariness". Which means that supporting one program or another depended on the free will of the single governments or municipalities, without coercion or sanctions. With the result that many responsible, short-sighted politicians in fear of losing the votes of their electorate, preferred to say "no", refusing to accept even negligible numbers of asylum-seekers. It was the Minister of the Interior, Marco Minniti, who broke this highly dangerous vicious circle. Since the summer 2017, he tried to stop *ab origine* the flow of migrants to Italy. He made his own the battle of who wants against who doesn't want to govern immigration. He moved on two fronts to win it. The first: the code of

conduct of the NGOs signed in July 2017. That imposed order and laws to the vessels that for too long had contributed, without even realising, to the transformation of Mare Nostrum (our sea – the Mediterranean) into Mare Vostrum (your sea) at the mercy of unscrupulous traffickers. The second: it re-established the relationship with the Libyan authorities. From the political exponents to the generals and up until the union leaders of the main coastal cities and the tribal heads who only Muhammad Gheddafi was able to bring into agreement. And we are not just talking about simple handshakes. Every which way, in exchange for Italian (and European) financing, the Ministry of the Interior put into place a Holy Alliance against human trafficking towards Italy. A highly sophisticated and complex diplomatic canvas that based on the figures, has led to the desired results. The numbers tell, in fact, of a nosedive in arrivals. Compared to the same period in 2016, the number of immigrants disembarked on the Italian coast has decreased by 68 % (44, 846 compared to 14, 391).

In the context of this result, it should not come by surprise that at the end of August 2017, during the Paris Summit on Immigration, France, Germany and Spain agreed to the Minniti strategy on all fronts. With the four-way agreement signed in the French capital the ball of emergency immigration has been passed from the international criminal organizations to the EU governments. Put the brakes on illegal immigration and accelerate legal immigration. So much so that the central premise of the new agreement is the ab origine selection in Chad or Niger, under the aegis of the UNHCR, of those with their papers in order to be granted refugee status in Europe.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Enter Trieste. Within this context, and with specific reference to SPRAR, the program in Trieste is an exception that confirms the extraordinary potential of this Italian system of diffused reception. The municipality of Trieste adhered to SPAR from the beginning (2002) and even before that, with the program PNA (June 2001). In fact, it could be said that the experimentation in Trieste regarding an organized welcome of refugees, with the assistance of the municipality (from 1998 with the crisis of Kosovo), provided the impetus for the birth of SPAR. The “Lampedusa of the Northeast,” as Trieste has been called, welcomed hundreds of refugees from ex-Yugoslavia in the ‘90’s and was able to succeed where others had failed or had not even ventured to try: successfully experimenting with the model of *diffused reception* that is the antithesis of the super-Center or CARA like the one in Mineo. However, it needs to be clarified that Trieste did not invent anything new. The municipality simply deserves the credit for having put into practice the framework of the already existing cultural patrimony of the SPRAR created by

Law 189 in 2002. That sees the local municipalities as principal actors, even if on a voluntary basis, in what legislation has defined as integrated reception. The exact opposite of the logic behind the CARA, it aims for economic and social inclusion of the new arrivals, starting with, but not exclusively, a solution that provides for living quarters designed for small numbers (Terranova, 2016). The municipal governments in Trieste deserve credit for having interpreted the spirit of SPRAR effectively, and for having implemented the system effectively, in collaboration with local NGOs, for the last 15 years. This explains why, according to the latest data that comes from two of the primary sources that have contributed to this success, Caritas and the Consorzio Italiano Solidarietà (Italian Consortium for Solidarity, ICS), in Trieste, 70% (Caritas, 2016) of the living quarters provided to asylum-seekers are in private apartments or in small centers. The fundamental strength of this approach is that, contrary to the CARA, it avoids that the asylum-seekers and refugees, as well as those who host them, view the experience as a continual emergency situation. A reality that assumes an even greater importance if we consider that this phenomenon will present itself always more frequently in the near future. To continue to view the situation as parenthetical adds to a prevailing emergency logic, which is useless and counterproductive and which causes the public to have a distorted view of reality, to the point that indigenous citizens perceive that they are truly being "invaded by foreigners". A mismatch between the perception and the reality, given that an accurate snapshot of the situation is contrary to what people think, in terms of the number of refugees actually residing in the country: Italy hosts an average of 1.9 refugees per 1000 inhabitants, against that of Germany (3.9), France (4.1), Holland (5.2), Austria (8.4) and Sweden (17.4) (UNHCR, 2016).

If today it is possible to talk about the "Trieste Model", it is not only thanks to the local government's ability to put into practice the guidelines of SPRAR, with the essential support of the NGOs operating in the territory. There is another factor: the ability to withstand the *stress test*, to use a term from the banking sector.

From the spring of 2013, in fact, there were ever-increasing demands for reception of a steadily growing number of asylum - seekers, which coming from the Eastern Mediterranean and crossing the so-called Balkan route, arrived at what the media termed the "Lampedusa of the North East". In response, the Municipality and the Prefecture of Trieste signed a Convention for the management of an extra-SPAR for all asylum seekers that were present in the municipal territory. The Convention had four fundamental objectives (Municipality of Trieste, 2016):

- To guarantee asylum-seeker timely access to reception, from the moment he/she has demonstrated the desire to seek international protection, or, even prior to perfectly completing the administrative procedure of

verbalizing the request for asylum, in accordance with the Directive: 2013/33/2013;

- To prevent the establishing of parallel reception systems those are not homogeneous, by overseeing and maintaining tight control of the entire system;
- To guarantee asylum-seekers equal rights and access to a high standard of service (within this context the Convention does not stipulate a limit or maximum number), by ensuring as much uniformity as possible between the system SPRAR and the system “extra-SPRAR”, in coordination with the Central System of the SPRAR itself and by creating a seamless interface between the two systems;
- To prevent as much as possible, a sense of alarm and the creating of situations of social distress, thus, counteracting the possible spread of acts of intolerance and discrimination.

Within the Convention cited, the individuals admitted passed from 202 as of December 31st, 2013, to 638 as of May 31st, 2015: a clear increase in the number of beneficiaries that reached its peak between January 2014 and May 2015, recording an increase of +316%. Based on the latest data available, updated in December 2015, the numbers of individuals being hosted throughout the territory of Trieste come from 19 different countries, with a clear majority of Afghani and Pakistani refugees (83%). It warrants highlighting that even during the management of the system “extra-SPAR”, the Municipality of Trieste and those managing the SPRAR (I.C.S. and Caritas), chose to adopt the “diffused reception” model of welcome. When possible, they I.C.S. located private small apartments on the market and rented them (i.e. to an average of 4-5 people). These were located throughout the urban area, thus, avoiding concentration in only one section of the city. Other structures provided by ICS and Caritas differed from the apartments in that they were collective centers, though they were small, in any event (for an average of 20 and less than 50 individuals) located within urban areas or near them, accessible by public transportation. Temporary structures were provided by two hotels and by some residence: used as temporary means, when possible, with the intention of transferring the refugees as soon as possible to one of the formally designated welcome structures. Again, it is important to highlight the fact that even in the structures used for temporary reception, all of the services provided by the SPRAR were made available and social workers were offered on a continual basis by the managing bodies; the temporary structures are rented or managed by I.C.S. from private parties, who do not have any role in the management of the facilities, but who might, in some cases, participate in very limited functions pertaining to initial welcome activities. In conclusion, it should be clarified that with respect

to the 4th objective of the Convention, the reception system in Trieste is structured in such a manner that the coordination between the SPRAR and "extra-SPAR" enables a timely response, whereby the asylum-seeker, and especially in the case of guaranteed subsidiary or human protection, can find a place within the system as soon as one becomes available. The connection between the two systems is primarily aimed at guaranteeing continuity in the procedures that the beneficiaries of protection must go through. In this way, unexpected situations that might lead to a lack of assistance for the subjects can be avoided. It is clear that all of the subjects are in need of securing a path towards social inclusion.

Diffused, flexible, organized and supportive. These are the four adjectives that embody the exceptional system that the reception in Trieste has put into place. Based on the principle of equal distribution (Casti, 2011), this system has enabled the reception, and often integration, of the newly arrived refugees, while reducing their concentration to a minimum, in certain areas of the city or in *ad hoc* centers. Despite all of the difficulties that might be encountered, these solutions allow the combining of safety, social peace and the right to asylum. Could this possibly be the "obvious solution" to resolving the refugee emergency? The answer has to be, "Yes, at least, in part". For this reason it would be strongly advised to go beyond the concept of "voluntariness" and to consider the SPRAR, a true administrative tool for providing reception to refugees throughout the national territory. An exercise that rests with the Municipalities, as indicated by art. 118 of the Constitution, a fact that is well known.

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GEOGRAFSKI RASPORED PRIJEMA IZBEGLICA U ITALIJI I "LAMPEDUZA SEVEROISTOKA" – STUDIJA SLUČAJA

Giuseppe TERRANOVA

REZIME

Članak se sastoji iz četiri dela: Uvodna razmatranja; Italija kao zemlja azila i imigracije; Dihotomija italijanskog sistema prihvata izbeglica; Diskusija i Zaključak. Osnovna teza od koje se pošlo u radu je da politika prijema izbeglica u Trstu može biti model za celu Italiju. Uz korišćen geografski i geopolitički pristup, uvod nam daje okvir i istorijski osvrt na razvitak i unapređenje italijanskih zakona o upravljanju i prihvatu tražilaca azila i izbeglica. Pre svega je naglašeno da, i pored toga što je u suprotnosti sa italijanskim zakonom, italijanski parlament nikada nije odobrio suštinski važan zakon o azilu. Drugi deo rada ukazuje kako i kada je Italija postala značajna imigraciona destinacija. U ovom delu se može pronaći i okvir Evropskog imigracionog i azilnog zakonodavstva, koje nam omogućava da razumemo zašto Brisel nije pomogao Italiji kada se suočavala sa migracionim pritiskom sa Balkana i iz Afrike. Posebno su naglašene prednosti i slabosti Dablinske Konvencije, kao i Evropske agencije za upravljanje operativnom saradnjom na spoljašnjim granicama Evropske unije (FRONTEX). Treći deo rada daje iscrpan i detaljan pregled sistema prijema tražilaca azila u Italiji, zahvaljujući kojem je moguće dobiti jasniju sliku o načinu na koji Vlada Italije garantuje prvi i drugi stepen prihvata i zaštite izbeglica. U tom smislu, autor je dao kritički osvrt na preveliki, preopterećen i loše zamišljen prihvatni centar za tražioce azila (Centri di Accoglienza per Richiedenti Asilo - C.A.R.A), koji je zvanični Vladin centar, ali kojim se loše upravlja. Suprotno tome, bolje (bar u teoriji) funkcioniše Sistem zaštite tražilaca azila (Sistemi di Protezione per Richiedenti Asilo - S.P.R.A.R.) koji predstavlja razgranati program koji funkcioniše na celoj teritoriji Italije, a kojim upravljaju lokalni organi vlasti i volonteri. Takođe, posebna pažnja je usmerena i na novu politiku upravljanja migracijama koju je predstavilo Ministarstvo unutrašnjih poslova Italije početkom 2017. godine. Poslednji deo rada se bavi problematikom Trščanskog sistema prihvata izbeglica u svetlu značaja "difuznog prijema". To objašnjava zašto se 70% prihvatnih kapaciteta u Trstu nalazi u privatnim kućama i apartmanima. Osnovna prednost ovakvog prihvata je da se izbeglice ne sagledavaju kao stalna pretnja. To je osnovni razlog zašto bi Trst mogao da posluži kao model za celu Italiju.

Ključne reči: prnudne migracije, migraciona politika i politika azila, socijalna izolovanost, izbeglo lice, prostor, izbeglički kamp.